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Social Networks and the Challenge of Hate Disguised as Fear and Politics  
 
In 2018, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg sat before a U.S. Senate committee fielding 
questions regarding a host of contentious issues for the world’s largest social network. At the 
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Abstract 
This case study examines social networks as the modern intersections of radical 
discourse and political extremism. But, as this research will show, extremist 
content in social networks, even that which has telegraphed violent hate crimes, is 
seldom communicated in textbook forms bigotry or provocations of violence. 
Today, the true challenge for social networks like Facebook and Twitter is 
addressing hate speech that reads more like fear mongering and identity politics, 
and thus, does not get flagged by monitors. From accounts dedicated to inciting 
fear over the “threat of immigrants” or “black crime,” to groups that form around 
hashtags declaring that a “#whitegenocide” is underway. These narratives 
represent the more ubiquitous versions of hate culture that permeate these popular 
spaces and radicalize cultural discourses happening there. This case study explores 
how such rhetoric has the same capacity to deliver messages of hate, and even 
incite violence, by investigating six hate crimes from 2019 that were preceded by 
social media diatribes. The comparative analysis will show how these examples 
mostly featured nonviolent expressions of cultural paranoia, rather than avowals 
of violence or traditional hate speech, thus making them harder to detect by 
programs seeking out such threats in plain sight. The research then examines the 
user policies of leading social networks to assess whether their guidelines on 
hateful and violent content are purposed to address the kinds of language that were 
espoused by these violent extremists. The study considers the strategies being 
employed by social networks to expose hateful content of all forms, and the need 
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midpoint, Senator Ben Sasse would ask arguably the most important question of the hearing: 
“Can you define hate speech?” (McArdle, 2018). Amid the amalgam of inquiries, this 
question from the Nevada senator had just cut to the core matter that social networks find 
themselves facing: How to define hate inside their communities, and then how to address it.  
Hate crimes in the 21st century follow an all too familiar blueprint. As a deadly shooting at a 
Pittsburgh synagogue reminded everyone later that year, it begins with intolerance that 
escalates into tirade online, before graduating into action in the community. Just prior to 
opening fire inside the Tree of Life Synagogue, the gunman posted a final diatribe on the 
social network Gab. “I can't sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, 
I'm going in,” he declared after venting about the Honduran migrants that were traveling 
toward the U.S. border (Roose, 2018).   
 It is true that a pattern of violent extremists telegraphing their intentions online has 
been a disturbing feature of some recent hate crimes. Elliot Rodger brought his misogynistic 
venom to YouTube where he vowed “retribution” against women before carrying out a lethal 
shooting spree through UC Santa Barbara (Pickert, 2014). And Omar Mateen denounced “the 
filthy ways of the west” and promised “vengeance” for ISIS on Facebook the day he killed 49 
people at a LGBTQ nightclub in Orlando (Alexander, 2016). At the 2018 hearing, both the 
Facebook CEO and Senator easily agreed that any speech that promoted or condoned violence 
against a group of people should be recognized as hate speech and immediately removed from 
the network.   
 But the more complex question of how to classify and address nonviolent hate speech 
was left unresolved. And that may be the more crucial question to answer today. That is 
because most hateful rhetoric in social networks does not typify the textbook definition of 
fighting words directed at a particular community. And even outright expressions of bigotry – 
racial slurs or cultural ridicule – is rare to find, as users know well which words will get them 
kicked off their favorite social networks. Research on extremism in social media and political 
blogs has increasingly found that, rather than overt bigotry, today’s online hate speech comes 
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 The following research examines how extremists in social media are trading messages 
of hate and cultural superiority for provocations of fear and cultural paranoia. These inverted 
expressions of hate have become cleverly encased inside faux-political and fear-driving 
claims that tacitly deliver the same message: That white western civilization is now a race 
under siege (Phillips & Yi, 2018). In the monitored spaces of social networks, these messages 
come in a variety of forms, from conspiracy theories to political dog whistles (Zannettou et 
al., 2018). This case study will examine how such rhetoric has the same capacity to deliver 
messages of hate and incitement through provocative pretexts that justify actions of cultural 
“self-defense.” Specifically, the research explores how some recent hate crimes that were 
preceded by social media diatribes have featured these nonviolent expressions of cultural 
paranoia rather than avowals of violence, thus making them harder to detect by programs 
seeking out such threats in plain sight.  
 The study further explores the role of social networks to consider the policies and 
actions they are undertaking, and how the promotion of “counter narratives” (Meleagrou-
Hitchens & Kaderbhai, 2017) might work to expose these deliberately ambiguous forms of 
intolerance. Because some users are learning to conceal bigotry in permissible forms like fear 
and identity politics, shining a spotlight on these surreptitious discourses might be the best 
prescription for countering them.  
In fact, social networks recently adopted similar measures to expose disinformation in 
the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. As conspiracy theory groups like QAnon spread fictitious 
claims that the election had been systematically stolen from President Donald Trump – a 
claim that would be propagated in social media by the president himself – Twitter and 
Facebook began to flag these posts as false. The violent insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on 
January 6, 2021, was premised upon the very same claims, further calling into question the 
appropriate level of response that social media should adopt when confronting such 
inflammatory conspiracy theories. Facebook and Twitter ultimately chose to deplatform the 
social media accounts of President Trump and some 70,000 QAnon-supporters, a decision 
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election (Dwoskin, 2021). However, the networks’ actions would also reinvigorate the debate 
about whether deplatforming is a long-term solution to the greater issue of political extremism 
in social media (Hutchinson, 2021). While deplatforming may be necessary in certain 
circumstances, this research argues for social networks to amplify their collective voices as 
gatekeepers, rather than simply as hosts. Through injecting context and forewarnings about 
those discourses that thematically sow distrust and disdain for other groups, social networks 
may help their online communities learn to recognize, reject, and report this form of content. 
 
Online Radicalization: From Stormfront to Social Media 
 
Over the past two decades, research in the processes and forms of radicalization have centered 
on the Internet as a decentralized space where extremist have come together to share and 
spread their ideologies. Numerous works in online extremism have studied Stormfront.org, 
the earliest and most visited community for white nationalist/supremacist exchange. Caren et 
al. (2012) examined the myriad ways that Stormfront’s design strategically fostered a sense of 
community for members to freely post about the white identity in more mainstream contexts 
such as politics, popular culture, and even dating. Other studies have observed that while a 
shared white identity occupies much of the forum discussions, socio-political events often 
redirect that focus back to the denigration of perceived enemy out-groups (Bliuc et al., 2019). 
And more recent research has explored Stormfront as a measure for understanding how 
extremist conversation evolves over time, and thereby potentially accelerates a path toward 
radicalization (Scrivens et al., 2020).   
 What many of these studies agree upon is that extremist websites like Stormfront serve 
a critical function in the process of radicalization by providing a digital echo chamber wherein 
followers are exposed to only those ideas that validate their preexisting racist belief systems, 
and thus, the community becomes “a reinforcing agent or accelerant” in the process of 
radicalization (Von Behr et al., 2013, p. 17). Warner (2010) explains further: “If individuals 
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will polarize and become increasingly radical” (p. 431). Coupled with intolerant themes like 
those featured on Stormfront, or other radical websites like American Renaissance or the 
Occidental Observer, studies have found a “collective identity” forms in which members 
share grievances and even linguistic patterns about perceived out-groups (Bliuc et al., 2019). 
 Beyond the echo chamber effect, research has also pointed to a gradual transitioning in 
the collective identity of white supremacists online. Hartzell’s (2020) investigation of 
Stormfront found that its forums were appealing to more mainstream audiences by moving 
away from white supremacist discourse and toward articulating a “communal belonging, 
common sense, and pride” in white nationalism (p. 129). The transition from supremacist to 
nationalist might seem like a minor sematic adjustment but, as this study will explore, it 
represents a broader, more deliberate campaign to rebrand bigotry in “legitimized” terms. 
Hartzell writes, “Stormfront members work to construct rhetorical distance between white 
supremacy and white nationalism by affirming the irrationality of white supremacy while 
imagining white nationalism as reasonable.”   
 Just as the shifting expressions of identity have suggested the intention of radical 
groups to enter into a more accepted sphere of public discourse, so has the gradual migration 
of white nationalist activity from fringe websites like Stormfront, to social networks like 
Twitter and Facebook. According to watchdog organizations like the Simon Wiesenthal 
Center (2019), the rise in extremist or hateful sentiment in popular social media has surged in 
recent years, and been linked to more offline organizational activity. Ganesh’s (2020) study of 
the alt-right, as a growing radical network, underscored how social networks like Twitter are 
the new spaces where white nationalist discourse is spread and amplified through permissible 
contexts, focusing on populist grievances that highlight themes of white victimization.  
 The window of permissible discourse is certainly narrower in social media, as 
compared to a website like Stormfront, and yet within these mainstream spaces, radical voices 
are learning to communicate intolerance more covertly. Feffer (2019) describes how the 
radical right has adopted certain narratives in social media involving issues like immigration, 
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“injecting fringe ideas into mainstream culture” (para. 3). The Anti-Defamation League has 
also described how anti-immigrant groups have “successfully moved the Overton Window – 
or the boundaries of what’s considered acceptable within political action and public 
discourse” (para. 2). They attribute the success of these groups’ efforts to “mainstream hate” 
to their use of social media, inside which they “demonize immigrants and get their messages 
across to the public” (para. 6). Research has also found that users with extremist ideologies 
have increasingly learned to evade the monitoring eyes of social networks. Ayad’s (2019) 
study on the continued presence of terrorist-affiliated videos on YouTube highlighted some of 
the tactics their authors use to avoid detection. These include labeling their content as 
educational, and including links to mainstream websites. Effectively, white nationalists and 
other extremist groups have steadily been moving beyond the closed echo chambers of 
websites like Stormfront, and into the open and interconnected spaces of social media, where 
they are learning to game the system. 
 
Censorship versus Exposure 
 
Today, a search in social media for terms like immigrants, Black Live Matter, Muslims, or 
Jews will often turn up the same spring-loaded narratives: The alleged threat of Hispanic 
invaders pouring across the border, or the prospect of black-on-white crime, the infiltration of 
Sharia law inside the U.S., or the Jewish globalist conspiracy supposedly behind it all. On 
Facebook, a video that has been viewed over 10,000 times forewarns of a “white genocide” 
now underway. It features black figures populating the planet and culminates in the image of 
a white child morphing into a brown child.2 On Twitter, another popular meme depicts the 
“Islamic Terrorist Network” spread across a map of the United States as it pinpoints the 
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locations of various Muslim centers.3 Without calling for violence, these narratives play well 
inside today’s social networks where bigots, veiled behind anonymous user accounts, can 
openly communicate their intolerance as long as they stay within the lines.   
 And that brings us back to the challenge and choice presently before platforms like 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram. As these companies attempt to refine their 
algorithms and revise their terms of service to better implicate the types of violence-inciting 
or bigoted expression that is unwelcome in their spaces, they find themselves struggling with 
the complexities of modern hate speech. Speaking on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to 
root out such content, Zuckerberg conceded: 
 
Some problems lend themselves more easily to AI solutions than others. Hate 
speech is one of the hardest, because determining if something is hate speech is 
very linguistically nuanced. You need to understand what is a slur and whether 
something is hateful, not just in English, but a majority of people on Facebook 
use it in languages that are different across the world. (Quinn, 2020)  
 
 This dilemma of how to identify hateful and extremist sentiment online has been the 
focus of much debate. While some studies have highlighted the failings of social networks to 
carry out comprehensive analyses for detecting extremism (Ayad, 2019), most point to a 
foundational challenge, which is how to define and recognize hate speech in the first place. 
Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai (2017) write, “Internet companies, governments, and 
researchers alike are still faced with problems associated with negative measures. What 
constitutes extreme material? What should be censored?” (p. 58).  The authors explored the 
two most common approaches to confronting online extremism, censorship and exposure. 
Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai explain that with “soft” methods of exposure, in which 
groups also create counter-narratives that educate others about extremist content, “there 
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remains both a lack of understanding of how this would occur, or how such narratives could 
be effectively disseminated” (p. 7). However, the recent surge of harmful disinformation 
regarding alleged voter fraud in the 2020 election, and the collective response to it, has 
potentially laid the groundwork for how social networks are learning to counter-message 
dangerous forms of content at both a micro and macro-level. From the labelling of potentially 
harmful posts, that provides context for their deceptions, to the high-profile exposure and 
admonishment of such material in news media and advertising campaigns, social networks 
have begun to demonstrate a more collective and effective response mechanism.  
 Still, the other common course of action by social networks continues to be the 
sweeping removal of toxic material, primarily dangerous forms of disinformation and overt 
hate speech. In some cases, these deplatforming efforts have proven effective. Alexander 
(2017) demonstrated how Twitter’s suspensions of ISIS-supporting accounts significantly 
diminished that terror network’s “ability to gain traction on the platform, likely hindering 
their reach to potential recruits” (p. 19). More recently, research conducted by Zignal Labs on 
Twitter’s deplatforming of Donald Trump and QAnon accounts showed a rapid 73% drop in 
subsequent disinformation regarding “election fraud” (Dwoskin, 2021). 
However, several studies have come to similar conclusions on the limitations and 
long-term ineffectiveness of censorship: that simply closing the door to one social network 
will lead radical users to the next venue where fewer restrictions exist. Addressing this 
resiliency factor, Johnson et al. (2019) write: 
 
[T]he key to understanding the resilience of online hate lies in its global 
network-of-network dynamics. Interconnected hate clusters form global ‘hate 
highways’ … Our mathematical model predicts that policing within a single 
platform (such as Facebook) can make matters worse, and will eventually 
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Many such ‘hate highways’ have arguably already been formed, leading to those 
communities that advertise fewer constraints on speech. Zannettou et al. (2018) and 
Comerford (2020) each observed a high prevalence of hate speech forging inside less 
regulated domains like 4chan, 8chan, and Gab, which advertise themselves as a welcoming 
alternative to the mainstream and restrictive social networks.    
 The present research does not argue that either one of these two approaches, 
censorship or exposure, is always the correct remedy for countering extremism. There are 
different contexts that should be considered, such as whether the material in question 
promotes violence. However, where bigotry takes on permissible forms like fear-mongering 
or identity politics in order to obscure the radical ideologies behind them, a counter-narrative 
approach might better educate the public about how such rhetoric is associated with hate 
speech, thus priming them to identify and reject it. As this study will show, some assailants 
have used these gray areas of extremism in social media to espouse their “political” and “fear-
based” justifications for committing hate crimes, underscoring the need to further establish 
these style communications as vehicles for hate. 
 
The Potency of Fear  
 
When David Duke ran for the US Senate in Louisiana in 1990, the former Ku Klux Klansman 
never used racial slurs when speaking of African-Americans, who were nonetheless a 
centerpiece of his campaign. In fact, according to those that covered his Senate run, Duke 
“rarely even used the word black,” because he had mastered the use of “other codes” like his 
references to “the massive rising welfare class” and “welfare mothers who just have babies,” 
or the perils of affirmative action (Maraniss, 1990, para. 9). More than being adept at dog 
whistle politics – the practice of speaking in coded terms that those attuned to racism would 
understand – Duke had obtained a shrewd understanding of how to employ “racial threat” as a 
mobilizing idea (Giles & Buckner, 1993). This was 1990, and the days of segregation 
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political era.  But racist sentiment was still a potent messenger if one knew how to resurrect it. 
Duke skillfully appealed to the fears of a sector of the white working-class that felt threatened 
by the rising black population (Boulard, 1991). He also knew how to lay blame at the 
doorstep of another scapegoat, the Jewish community, again without engaging in direct anti-
Semitism. Maraniss (1990) writes:  
 
At a rally in Shreveport, Duke went after one of his favorite targets, the New 
Orleans newspaper. “You know the New Orleans Times-Picayune is down on 
me,” Duke told supporters. “But you know who owns the Times-Picayune, 
don't you?” From the front row came the reply: “Jews. Jews. Jews.” (para. 15) 
 
Duke’s capacity to harness hate inside the electorate was not just about his crafty 
employment of euphemisms and insinuation. Rather, it was about the power of using fear 
rhetoric and identity politics to cultivate the same level of bigotry from receptive audiences. 
Why do these rhetorical forms work, and how do they flourish inside today’s social networks?   
 Let us consider the hashtag #whitegenocide, which a 2016 study cited as the most 
tweeted phrase among white nationalists (Berger, 2016). It has since come to encapsulate an 
array of messages pertaining to an “endangered white race,” as further research has showed 
by tracing the hashtag through Twitter dialogues on Hispanic immigration, Muslim refugees, 
and interracial crime (Deem, 2019). There are three reasons why #whitegenocide has become 
a prevalent device among white nationalists and other authors of bigotry. First, it allows these 
groups to integrate their extremist message into the body politic of social networks. By 
marrying racial resentments to mainstream politics, as Duke did with affirmative action in the 
nineties, racists are attempting to legitimize hate inside the political exchange of social media. 
And the coalescence of #whitegenocide with timely topics, like border security, provides a 
certain degree of cover to those wishing to espouse bigotry in a context that is accepted in 
social media (see Figure 1). Second, these stories of racial threat allow racists to adopt the 
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is here where a troubling pattern has emerged among those who have transferred the message 














Figure 2. Robert Bowers’ final post prior to his deadly attack on a Pittsburgh synagogue.  
  
The third motivation for trading the old declarations of ‘white supremacy’ for today’s 
outcries of ‘white genocide’ is that, where the former once fostered a false sense of 
superiority, the latter produces fear. And research has shown that fear can be a potent 
deliveryman for hate. Gerbner’s (1998) theory of the Mean World Syndrome was a critical 
branch of his larger work in Cultivation analysis; studying how the heavy viewing of 
television led audiences to perceive their worlds as a reflection of the TV world. In terms of 
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suggested that the steady consumption of such content cultivates in audiences a sense of fear 
about the likelihood of violence happening to them, as well as a deep paranoia about those 
groups traditionally depicted as the culprits:  
 
Gerbnerʼs bottom-line point was that without positive representations to 
balance the bad, the meanest members of minority groups are allowed to stand 
in for all the rest – creating a distorted and menacing picture that leaves 
viewers feeling under attack, and reinforcing a siege mentality that feeds and 
feeds off of anger and rage. (Morgan, 2010)  
 
 Of course, today, narratives of imminent danger can be found in all forms of new 
media, from online news, to political blogs, to the hostile representations of our world that we 
share with each other in social networks. And so returning to the messages of cultural threat 
that populate these networks, especially where political talk is happening, the perception of a 
white genocide underway is just one of a series of fear-driving claims that circulates within 
this marketplace of ideas. Others that will be examined in this case study include the 
professed threats of Hispanic migration, Muslim refugees, and Jewish control. 
 Gerber’s point was that fears brought on by exposure to such messages of cultural 
threat and notions of violence happening to us, eventually lead to another emotion – hostility.  
It is for this reason that statements about the threat of refugees or immigrants have become the 
preferred vehicle for racists in communities across social media. There, they can parade as 
politics, while in fact stoking cultural anxieties that can lead to blame and bigotry.   
 
Violence Between the Lines 
 
In their study of online discourses surrounding the migration of Syrian refugees into Europe, 
Sayimer and Derman (2017) explored the prevalence of “fear speech” as a deeper, and 
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they describe how fear “rationalizes and legitimizes racism” in this shared context, and in 
doing so, can provide certain viewers with the validation they are seeking to take action. They 
wrote, “Violence coined as ‘self-defense’ seems more acceptable” (p. 392). Here, fear-based 
hate speech can be understood as either a genuine form of paranoia expressed by hysterical 
individuals, or a useful ruse whereby bigotry is being dressed up as fear in order to justify 
one’s hate. In both cases, fear is connected not only to hate, but also to the potential for 
violence. Buyse (2014) explains, “The instigation of fear among one’s own group, rather than 
hatred against the other, has been found to be a key mechanism in such processes leading to 
violence. This may lead to accepting state violence against the group one fears” (p. 785). 
 For social networks, whose chief concern is stemming that content which could inspire 
or even preview hate crimes, the challenge returns to language. When does an authentic 
criticism over a subject like the influx of foreign refugees cross a threshold into becoming a 
pretext for justifying hostility and violence? For companies like Twitter, the complex task of 
determining the intent and character of a hateful commentary includes the question of whether 
the words should be taken seriously, or even attributed to the author. After all, much of what 
we find in extremism in social media comes couched in the form of humor, or opinions that 
seem twice removed from their author, such as a retweet that shares the bigoted ideas of 
others. There are reposted news headlines that, strung together, are meant to highlight the 
offense of one particular group, or memes that demagogue entire populations. And then there 
are the more extreme examples of cultural rants that have signaled the violent intent of their 
authors. These cases are seldom on the radar of social networks until after the assailants 
commit their acts. Thus, social networks continue to contend with the ambiguity of radicalism 
as it arises in their spaces, taking on its many forms, from fear, to humor, to political 
commentary. Many political leaders have called on social networks to swiftly curtail this toxic 
trend, as studies continue to show a correlation between online radicalism and offline violence 
(Comerford, 2020; Wojcieszak, 2009). One landmark study recently found a strong 
connection between increased Facebook use in towns in Germany and anti-refugee hate 
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close, and from the perspective of those charged with resolving it, one must first analyze some 




The following case study investigates six social media publications whose authors went on to 
commit deadly hate crimes in the hours or days that followed their final posts. Our attempt is 
to understand, as social networks must do, the patterns that potentially exist among these 
communications. A comparative analysis was performed on the social media content of the 
assailants, focusing on the rhetorical nature of their communications and whether they 
expressed messages of hate speech, violence, fear, political commentary, or other forms of 
declaration. The examples selected were premised on hate crimes that occurred in 2019, 
carried out by assailants whose collective violence stole 93 innocent lives that year. The 
research analyzed their online writings prior to these acts. These communications varied in 
length and form, including multipage manifestos, public Tweets and Facebook posts, as well 
as obscure comments left on websites like YouTube and Instagram. The study then returns to 
the social networks’ user policies on hate speech and violent content to assess whether such 
guidelines are purposed to address the kinds of language that these violent extremists 
expressed.    
 
The Most Extreme Cases and the Shape They Take 
 For a moment, consider the geography of a social network from the perspective of 
someone wishing to espouse extremism there.  Why do social networks present fertile ground 
for these actors? Often, anonymity is cited as a central factor in allowing intolerant 
individuals to air the kinds of viewpoints they would otherwise never share in public (Brown, 
2018). Indeed, whereas the 2017 white nationalist gathering in Charlottesville was televised 
and highly revealing, social networks on the hand can be discreet, and therefore highly 














ISSN: 2363-9849          
else: listeners. Whether real or imagined, social networks present the sense that an extremist's 
thoughts are finally being heard, and even occasionally validated in the form of likes and 
retweets. Among the following cases of persons who went on social media before delivering 
violence to the public, they share notably different ideologies and targets. And we will see 
how difficult it is to establish a clear code of communication among them, the kind that could 
potentially thwart future threats. But one quality that intersects these assailants’ final posts 
was their motivation for a captive audience, and that element will be critical later when 
considering measures to combat hate culture in a medium that continues to present this stage.   
 
“He’s followed the formula” 
 For Brenton Tarrant, the stage of social media was literally that place from which he 
broadcast his rampage. Tarrant’s mass shooting spree in March of 2019 was directed at two 
mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, and was also livestreamed to a global audience on 
Facebook. He claimed 51 lives. Like the other cases that will be examined here, Tarrant’s 
action was a hate crime preceded by social media activity that either directly or indirectly 
previewed these ensuing events. As mentioned, all of these attacks were staged inside a single 
year. But Tarrant’s crime stands out for two reasons. First, it predated the others and was thus 
emulated in form by some of those shooters that followed. Speaking on Tarrant’s celebrated 
status among white nationalists, terrorism expert Greg Barton said, “He’s followed the 
formula and done what the formula delivered” (Maley, 2019, p. 3). Secondary to Tarrant’s 
influence was the role that social media played in the Christchurch massacre as both that of 
his publisher and broadcaster.  On the morning of March 15, the 28-year-old Tarrant posted a 
link on Twitter that brought his followers to a 74-page manifesto on 8chan, where he spelled 
out his motivations and alleged justifications for the oncoming violence. Minutes later he 
carried out his massacre, which he simultaneously livestreamed on Facebook for all to see.  
 Analysis of Tarrant’s manifesto, “The Great Replacement,” titled after a French novel 
bearing similar themes, evidences a mind that was fixated on the notion that the white identity 
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“The idea of “the great replacement” is based on the fantasy that “they” (especially migrants 
and Muslims) are intent on replacing “us” (whites, Christians)” (para. 5). For Tarrant, his 
writings present a dire manifestation of the white genocide mantra examined earlier, elevating 
it to justification to kill as many Muslims as possible and inspire others to do the same. Much 
of Tarrant’s manifesto is presented in Q&A style, in which he poses the questions he assumes 
others will ask, and then answers them. “Were/are you are you a neo-nazi?”4 No, he responds 
under the assumption he might be killed during the attack. In fact, he was not. “Do you feel 
any remorse for the attack?” No, he writes, “I only wish I could have killed more invaders.” 
“Why did you target those people?” Tarrant addresses this question often throughout his 
manifesto, though seldom enters into direct insults of Muslims or racial slurs on Islamic 
culture. He even contends he does not hate Muslims who live in their homelands, but dislikes 
those “choosing to invade our lands live on our soil and replace our people.” Tarrant’s 
obsession with his white race becoming a “demographic minority” is presented as his central 
motivation: 
 
It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates. If there is one thing I 
want you to remember from these writings, it’s that the birthrates must change 
… Even if we were to deport all Non-Europeans from our lands tomorrow, the 
European people would still be spiraling into decay and eventual death. 
 
It is from this paranoia that Tarrant pivots to self-aggrandizing expressions of 
martyrdom. He casts himself as nobly justified to “take a stand to ensure a future for my 
people.”  
 The citing of pretexts for taking defensive action, such as “taking a stand for our 
people,” is significant because such positions can be found throughout social media today in 
very much the same context as Tarrant is using here. Of course, in this lethal framework, we 
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look back at the writing that preceded a massacre and believe that what we are seeing is the 
very formula that social networks are trying to identify: A racist ideology, expressed in clearly 
searchable terms like “Muslim invaders,” “Non-Europeans,” and “take a stand,” that 
foreshadows violent intent. And, to the extent to which Tarrant expressed these delusions, in 
74-pages, and alluding to his desire to attack, there is the impression that such waving red 
flags can be detected in social media to avert future violence. But that impression would be an 
illusion. Realistically, little could be done to prevent these attacks, for only minutes after 
Tarrant posted the obscure Twitter link, he engaged in his assault at the Al Noor Mosque and 
Linwood Islamic Centre.   
 Moreover, Tarrant’s words were not exceptional by today’s standards of online white 
nationalist rhetoric, especially if one visits conspiracy-laden websites like 8kun, Reddit, Gab, 
and even Twitter, where political sentiments about standing up to so-called “invaders” are 
common. But the Christchurch massacre carried one additional element of social media 
activity that now presents a new problem for social networks. As described, Tarrant filmed his 
shooting spree and streamed it live over Facebook, where the deadly images were not only 
seen but also captured by viewers, only to later be replayed again and again:  
 
Copies of that footage quickly proliferated to other platforms, like YouTube, 
Twitter, Instagram and Reddit, and back to Facebook itself. Even as the 
platforms worked to take some copies down, other versions were re-uploaded 
elsewhere ... “It becomes essentially like a game of whack-a-mole” says Tony 
Lemieux, professor of global studies and communication at Georgia State 
University. (Perrigo, 2019, para 2) 
 
Tarrant’s use of social media to disseminate both his ideology and his horrific 
acts offers a critical insight into how such audience-intended hate content can not only 
spread, but also radicalize other potential extremists, even activating in some a desire 
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“Inspired by the horrific acts” 
   While Tarrant’s scenes of bloodshed began to emerge in the open plain of social 
media, they offered a vivid glorification of hateful violence that was evidently alluring to 
likeminded individuals. In the months that followed, two new shooters surfaced who cited the 
Christchurch carnage as their inspiration, and in doing so, followed a recognized pattern of 
extremists who “copy behaviors observed directly or in the media” (Youngblood, 2020, p. 2). 
John Earnest, 19, attempted a killing spree at a synagogue in Poway, California, after posting 
his own manifesto to 8chan, writing, “Tarrant was a catalyst for me personally. He showed 
me that it could be done. And that it needed to be done.”5  Earnest also attempted to 
livestream his hate crime on Facebook, but was not successful. His rifle jammed amid the 
attack and he only managed to fire off a few rounds, injuring worshippers, but tragically 
killing one woman, Lori Gilbert, who threw herself over the Rabbi to shield him.  
 Three months later, 21-year-old Patrick Crusius also followed in the footsteps of 
Brenton Tarrant, again posting a manifesto to 8chan minutes before entering a Walmart in El 
Paso, Texas with a semi-automatic. His online declaration began, “I support the Christchurch 
shooter and his manifesto. This attack is a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas. They 
are the instigator, not me.”6 Where Tarrant and Earnest directed their rage at the Muslim and 
Jewish communities, respectively, Crusius targeted Hispanic Americans and immigrants, 
killing 23 people. The Crusius manifesto read like a copy of Tarrant’s declaration, sounding 
alarms about the “Great Replacement” of Americans, with Crusius now assuming the role of 
heroic martyr: “I am simply defending my country from cultural and ethnic replacement 
brought on by an invasion.” His hate was also embedded in identity politics, as evidenced not 
 
5 John Earnest’s manifesto was reviewed through Middle Eastern Media Research Institute’s Domestic 
Terrorism Threat Monitor, and at https://archive.org/details/JohnEarnestManifesto_ 
201905/page/n3/mode/2up. 
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only in his manifesto, but his digital footprints that included several Twitter posts celebrating 
President Trump’s planned border wall and tough stance on Hispanic migrants. 
 The parallels between these shooters who were inspired by Tarrant’s writings extended 
to his favored themes of fear, blame, and cultural preservation. Earnest wrote about the 
dangers of the “tyrannical and genocidal Jew,” warning readers, “You should be more afraid 
of losing your entire race than this life you now live.” Crusius echoed the fixation on 
“invaders” having “the highest birthrate,” cautioning that immigration would lead to 
America’s undoing. Both offered themselves up as cultural martyrs of sorts, from Crusius 
who called on his readers to keep up the fight should he die, declaring, “I am honored to head 
the fight to reclaim my country from destruction,” to Earnest who said, “I only wish to inspire 
others and be a soldier that has the honor and privilege of defending his race.” One journalist 
later summarized how Earnest was “inspired by the horrific acts that preceded him: mass 
shootings at a synagogue in Pittsburgh and at two mosques in New Zealand” (Parvini, 2019, 
para. 1). Disturbingly, both he and Crusius indicated a desire to now do the same, and in all 
likelihood succeeded in transmitting their words to a new set of listeners.   
 
“There’s not really one profile”  
 Where the carefully constructed statements of the first three shooters took on a very 
similar shape and agenda, albeit different targets, the latter three cases were notably 
dissimilar in message and motivation. Connor Betts, a 24-year-old from Dayton, Ohio, shot 
and killed nine people at a local bar, including his sister. Later, those that knew Betts said he 
had a long history of misogyny and once reportedly compiled a “rape list” in high school 
(Grady, 2019, para. 2). His August 4th shooting followed months of social media posts in 
which he professed his ardent support for socialism, presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren, 
and guns. He also railed against everything from Republicans to moderate Democrats, to oil 
executives, white nationalists, and even the recent mass shooter, Patrick Crusius. But while 
Betts cultivated a politically charged mindset, his writings were not exactly the blatant 
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socialism, and i’ll not wait for the idiots to finally come round to understanding” (Croucher, 
2019, para. 10). And, “Millenials have a message for the Joe Biden generation: hurry up and 
die,” which he posted just hours before the shooting. In fact, if there was anything 
remarkable about Betts’ social media tirades, it is how unremarkable they were. Beyond 
some darker posts, like “kill every fascist,” which he tweeted about a white nationalist rally, 
or retweeting one post that satirically called for the beheading of oil executives to combat 
climate change, the Twitter account of Connor Betts resembled that of many other 
outrageous political commenters.  
 Mohammed Alshamrani was more direct in his use of social media to explain his 
contempt for America as “a nation of evil,” though he did not forecast his violent intentions 
as others did, and his Twitter activity could hardly be called a manifesto. The 21-year-old 
Alshamrani was a visiting aviation student from Saudi Arabia, training at the Naval Air 
Station in Pensacola, Florida. On December 6, he opened fire in one of his classrooms, 
killing three Navy sailors and wounding others. His violence was presumed to be an act of 
terrorism, and tellingly, some of the other Saudi students filmed Alshamrani’s massacre. 
They were detained after he was killed. Beyond his terrorist designation, Alshamrani’s 
operation should also be understood as an act of hate. His abhorrence was directed at 
Americans, and the sailors he killed were also his classmates. But on Twitter, he sought to 
present himself as neither culturally nor ideologically motivated: “I’m not against you for 
just being American, I don’t hate you because your freedoms, I hate you because every day 
your supporting, funding and committing crimes not only against Muslims but also 
humanity. I’m against evil” (Allen, 2019, para. 3). He went on to express disdain for 
American support of Israel, but beyond his status as a visiting member of the Saudi Air 
Force, his tweets were probably no more conspicuous than others critical of U.S. policy in 
the Middle East or Israel. And though ominous, his words were not openly belligerent. “You 
will not be safe until we live it as reality in [Palestine], and American troops get out of our 
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 Lastly, only four days later, David Anderson and Francine Graham carried out 
another hate crime, this time in New Jersey. The middle-aged couple, followers of the Black 
Hebrew Israelite fringe movement, began their shooting spree at a Jersey City cemetery. 
They killed one law enforcement officer and then proceeded to a nearby kosher supermarket, 
where inside, they executed three civilians before being killed themselves in a standoff with 
police. Anderson, viewed as the mastermind behind the attacks, had been active on several 
platforms including Instagram, YouTube, and SoundCloud. Using the pseudonym Nawada 
Maqabath, he seethed for months about the Jewish “imposters” and “wicked Israelites” who 
were supposedly inducing police violence against the Black community: “These police are 
NOT scared, they are carrying out a well planned agenda layed out by the upper echelon of 
Rosenbergs people” (McBride, 2019, para. 21). On YouTube, Anderson also expressed an 
affinity for Gavin Long, who had himself killed police officers in 2016 after sharing 
extremist conspiracies on YouTube. Echoing Long, Anderson wrote, “There are NO 
innocent cops. The entire organization was built with nefarious intentions against Israelites.” 
Because his writings were published under a pseudonym and spread across multiple sites and 
comment sections, Anderson’s radicalism was like most online in that it was obscure, 
sporadic, and thus, went undetected in the ether of the Internet.  
 As we next return to the question of how social networks learn to locate these sources 
of hate inside their communities, it is important to recognize where the thread line exists 
between these incidents, and where it does not. Tarrant, Earnest, and Crusius’ manifestos 
bore a notable resemblance in style and tone, but the examples of Betts, Alshamrani, and 
Anderson illustrate the inconsistent nature of these communications. Betts, who was 
potentially motivated by misogyny expressed political zealotry in his tweets – “kill every 
fascist” – but in truth, no more severe than the language one finds in countless social media 
texts. Alshamrani was inspired by his hate for Americans, though on Twitter his posts were 
temperate, assuming the more reasoned stance of, “I’m against evil.” And Anderson used 
religious grounds to justify his anti-Semitism, characteristic of the kind of conspiracy 
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All of these varied examples come back to the underlying question: Should social networks 
have been able to flag these dangerous actors?   
 A study of every mass shooting since 1966 found that while certain commonalties do 
exist among violent extremists, such as a desire for notoriety, the assailants are often more 
distinct than we realize: “What our research is starting to uncover is there’s not really one 
profile of a mass shooter” (Pane & Dazio, 2019, para. 9). It is therefore more critical to 
consider the elements of language, rather than the profiles of shooters, in attempting to isolate 
hateful extremism from within the vast traffic of social networks. 
 
Social Networks as Gatekeepers 
 
In many ways, the challenge before social networks is not unlike the test that many 
universities now face when a known extremist has been invited to speak on their campus: To 
host or not to host? Like universities, social networks understand that opening their doors to 
the likes of a Richard Spencer, someone who has called for “peaceful ethnic cleansing,” or 
Louis Farrakhan, who recently compared Jews to termites, lends the credibility of their 
community to these provocateurs of racism and anti-Semitism. And beyond credibility, these 
networks also provide unprecedented followings and approval to the kind of sentiments that 
would normally be denounced if they were carried on banners. Yet currently, Spencer and 
Farrakhan each have prominent accounts on Twitter because, in spite of their widely known 
beliefs, they have not broken the social network’s terms of service. So then, what kinds of 
rhetoric is prohibited in these spaces, and do these rules of communication and conduct come 
close to addressing the kinds of hate speech that we have been exploring?   
 An analysis of the user policies of leading networks reveals a common approach to 
defining hate speech. Facebook, for example, classifies hate speech along three tiers from the 
most extreme, “violent or dehumanizing speech,” to “statements of inferiority,” to “calls for 
exclusion or segregation” (Community Standards, 2020). Each of these categories pertains to 
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ethnicity.  Instagram, which is owned by Facebook but operates independently, forewarns 
users that it is not a site for expressing “support or praise” for hate groups. They, too, classify 
hate speech as the kind of language that promotes violence or levies attacks on someone 
based on their identity (Community Guidelines, 2020). YouTube continues this trend, chiefly 
categorizing hate in terms of expressed violence against groups or content that in any way 
dehumanizes, alleges superiority or inferiority, or uses racial or religious slurs (YouTube 
Policies, 2020). Notably, YouTube also forbids the use of conspiracy theories to malign 
others, including the denial of “well-documented violent events, like the Holocaust.” This is 
significant because it represents one of the few instances of a social network recognizing the 
use of coded language as a vehicle for hate. But what these policies do not address are the 
ubiquitous expressions of fear, specifically fear of minorities, which effectively serves to 
foment feelings of hate for them.  
 Returning to the six extremists whose lethal acts were preceded by social media 
tirades, we speculated whether their communications embodied the sort of characteristics 
that would be readily classified as hate speech by these social network guidelines. And while 
some of the language in the manifestos spoke of taking action, the need to defend the 
country, or even praise for recent hate crimes, most of the comments fixated on the perceived 
threat of others. By and large, these extremists used a rhetoric of fear and the façade of 
politics to cast blame on those communities that later became the subject of their violence. 
But despite this overwhelming theme, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube’s continued 
policies on hate speech do not account for the pervasive provocations of fear. 
 Twitter, by contrast, represented one of the only social networks to address fear as an 
inverted form of hate. They state, “We prohibit targeting individuals with content intended to 
incite fear or spread fearful stereotypes about a protected category, including asserting that 
members … are more likely to take part in dangerous or illegal activities, e.g., “all [religious 
group] are terrorists” (Twitter Rules, 2020). Yet, notwithstanding Twitter’s more 














ISSN: 2363-9849          
this space where fear-based bigotry is rampant as demagogic hashtags like #WhiteGenocide, 
#BlackCrimes, and #MigrantInvasion spread like ivy through their pages.  
 In the face of this proliferation of hate, social networks have turned to a natural ally – 
technology. Artificial intelligence programs are being employed to seek out the proscribed 
forms of hate speech, that they may flag, and sometimes, eliminate such content as it 
surfaces. But even if AI software is given an exhaustive list of violent terminologies and 
dehumanizing phrases to locate, we have seen how modernized hate speech can be well 
disguised. It appears political, humorous, and even creative, all toward the goal of traveling 
below the radar.  Moreover, opinion surveys have found that while a majority of social media 
users want social networks to remove hateful content (Edwards-Levy, 2018), most citizens 
cannot agree on what actually constitutes hate speech, as opposed to fair political comment 
(Ekins, 2017). This notable discrepancy begs the question on the issue of censorship: How 
can one expect an algorithm to discern hate speech if we ourselves cannot?   
 Thus, the expectation for social networks to fully purge their digital environments of 
hate is neither practical nor likely. In these densely trafficked spaces, the “game of whack-a-
mole” will likely continue in which one toxic thread is taken down, only to be replaced by 
another. And, if a hateful ideology is effectively blocked from residing in one social network, 
earlier studies established that these radical narratives simply migrate to another website with 
fewer restrictions (Comerford, 2020; Johnson at al., 2019; Zannettou et al., 2018). It is 
therefore perhaps more counteractive for social networks to begin thinking of ways to reform 
their communities in order to make them less inviting for racists to occupy. 
 
Rethinking Hate in Social Media 
 
For social networks, the adoption of more nuanced understandings of hate speech could 
allow them to better track the signs of intolerant authorship where it begins. Beyond 
provocations of violence, racial slurs, and other explicit forms of bigotry, this research 
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These can include incitements of fear over the threat of minorities (‘Muslims are plotting to 
attack us’); political tirades that encircle issues of identity (‘Immigrants are taking away our 
country’); cultural conspiracy theories (‘Jews are funding a migrant invasion’); and language 
that speaks of heroic resistance against a designated enemy (‘Defend your religious freedom 
against the gay rights agenda’). Such narratives, common in today’s social networks, are 
often smokescreens for bigotry, and have sometimes been used as pretexts for violence.  
 Until recently, social networks have been reluctant to extend their roles as 
gatekeepers in ways that would editorialize or rebuke the free speech of their users. But with 
the extraordinary surge of disinformation surrounding the 2020 election, social networks 
took unprecedented steps to begin exposing the deceptive content, while also taking to the 
airwaves to vociferously speak out against its future proliferation inside their communities. 
This counter narrative response was also applied to misleading information on COVID-19 
and voting during the election. Simultaneously, the CEOs of Facebook and Twitter became 
active in national media appearances to publicly reject any notion that false narratives on 
public health or voting was welcome in their spaces (CBS News, 2020).  
That same combination of a counter-messaging could be used to address the covert 
forms of extremism that bypass the community guidelines of social networks but nonetheless 
infiltrate and corrupt social discourses. At the micro-level, labeling, explaining, and exposing 
such material for what it is doing – inciting fear, spreading conspiracies, or engaging in 
identity politics – could stigmatize these offenses, as it inoculates and educates the 
community against them. And at the macro-level, a high profile and prolonged denunciation 
of identity politics and fear-incitement in social media may produce a counter narrative that 
reinforces the public’s recognition that these are forms of extremism. The strategy behind 
counter-narratives is that they represent the positions of the platforms, but also give voice 
and purpose for “empowering online actors to engage and denounce extremist propagators” 
(Meleagrou-Hitchens & Kaderbhai, 2017, p. 53).  
 Finally, platforms like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube must consider how to address 
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personal vitriol before a receptive audience. For extremists, the social factor of social media 
is critical because they have come to these networks to indulge their intolerant views with the 
belief that others are listening, and agreeing with them, and sometimes they are right. In the 
most dire cases, some would-be extremists observed the pattern by which assailants of hate 
crimes were able to gain notoriety, not only from their violent deeds, but from the words they 
published in social networks which were then immortalized in the media following their 
assaults. Thus, they too seek out this infamy following that same blueprint.   
 Social networks must examine new ways to stem the notion that hostile and fear-
driving rhetoric about different groups is somehow welcome in their spaces. The repeated 
public exposure and resounding denunciation of such discourses might be the best 
prescription to deterring hateful diatribes. Perhaps the clearest evidence of the effectiveness 
of community opposition to malicious posting can be found in examining those networks that 
impose few restrictions and renunciations of belligerent speech. Platforms like Reddit, Gab, 
and formerly 8Chan, embraced a more open policy of communication, and thus quickly 
became the preferred homes to more virulent authors, unfiltered hate speech, and shooter 
manifestos. What does this tell us? Perhaps that advocating for a community that discourages 
hateful content matters, because it sets the tone and communication climate that other users 
will feel empowered to protect.   
 Future research might explore how social networks are educating their communities 
about hate content, both in terms of defining it and discouraging its expression. A focus on 
Twitter’s recent identification of fear-inciting bigotry will be instructive to learn how that 
network is addressing this more concealed form of hate where other networks are not. But 
while revamping user policies on hate speech is a central step to isolating the language of 
extremists, such measures serve little purpose if the community does not know about them. 
Equally, the efforts to reduce hate speech in social media can only achieve a surface-level 
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